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FROM DODGE TO EBAY: THE ELUSIVE 
CORPORATE PURPOSE 
Dalia T. Mitchell† 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the history of the law of corporate purpose. I argue 
that the seemingly conflicting visions of corporate social responsibility 
and shareholder wealth maximization, which characterize contemporary 
debates about the subject, are grounded in two different paradigms for 
corporate law—a socio-political paradigm and an economic-financial 
one. Advocates of the socio-political paradigm have historically focused 
on the power that corporations could exercise in society, while those 
embracing the economic-financial paradigm expressed concerns about the 
power that the control group could exercise over the corporation’s 
shareholders. Over the course of the twentieth century, scholars have 
debated the merits of each of these paradigms and the concerns associated 
with them, while judges drew upon the academic and, more importantly, 
the managerial sentiments and concerns of the era to attach a purpose to 
corporate law’s doctrine, that is, the ultra vires doctrine in the early 
twentieth century, the enabling business judgment rule by midcentury, 
and the laws applicable to evaluating managerial responses to hostile 
takeovers at the century’s end. Ultimately, the cases seemingly 
addressing corporate purpose did not endorse wealth maximization or 
social responsibility as objectives. Rather, they empowered corporate 
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managers to set corporate goals without interference from shareholders or 
the courts. 
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“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits . . . .” 
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962)1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
N 2004, eBay had purchased 28.4% of Craigslist’s stock from Phillip 
Knowlton, one of Craigslist’s three shareholders.2 Adding insult to injury, 
eBay created Kijiji, a competitor site.3 Craig Newmark, Craigslist’s founder, 
and Jim Buckmaster, Craigslist’s third shareholder, were concerned that eBay 
would gain control of Craigslist and alter its purpose, which, as they 
envisioned, was to serve the community.4 In an attempt to prevent eBay from 
so doing, Craigslist’s board adopted several defensive measures including a 
poison pill, which “restricted eBay from purchasing additional craigslist shares 
                                                                                                                                            
1  MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
2  eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 6, 9–11 (Del. Ch. 2010).   
3  See id. at 6, 17–18. 
4  Id. at 7, 8, 32. 
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and hampered eBay’s ability to freely sell the craigslist shares it owned to third 
parties.”5 eBay sued, claiming that, as directors and controlling shareholders, 
Craig and Jim breached their fiduciary obligations to eBay, the minority 
shareholder.6 According to eBay, Craig and Jim could not pursue their 
proclaimed corporate purpose at the expense of maximizing profits for their 
shareholders, including eBay.7 
Chancellor Chandler of the Chancery Court of Delaware acknowledged 
Craigslist’s unique “community-service approach to doing business,” adding 
that “perhaps the most mysterious thing about Craigslist’s continued success 
is the fact that craigslist does not expend any great effort seeking to maximize 
its profits or to monitor its competition or its market share.”8 But Delaware 
law does not allow for unique approaches. Preventing Craigslist from using 
the poison pill, Chandler wrote:  
The corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for 
purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other 
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their 
investment. . . . Directors of a for-profit Delaware 
corporation cannot deploy a [policy] to defend a business 
strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth 
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ 
fiduciary duties under Delaware law.9 
Proponents of the shareholder primacy vision of corporate law, of the 
notion that corporations are stewards of their shareholders and, more 
accurately, their shareholders’ investment portfolios, were quick to celebrate 
Chandler’s opinion. In contrast, those who maintain that corporations should 
be socially responsible have argued that the decision was at odds with the 
Delaware courts’ typical deference to the board’s business judgment.10 Lyman 
                                                                                                                                            
5  Id. at 6. The other defensive tactics included:  
(2) implementing a staggered board that made it impossible for eBay to 
unilaterally elect a director to the craigslist board, and (3) seeking to obtain a 
right of first refusal in craigslist’s favor over the craigslist shares eBay owns by 
offering to issue one new share of craigslist stock in exchange for every five 
shares over which any craigslist stockholder granted a right of first refusal in 
craigslist’s favor. 
Id.; see also id. at 21–24. 
6  Id. at 7. 
7  Id. at 25–27. 
8  Id. at 8. 
9  Id. at 34–35. On Chandler’s treatment of the two additional defensive tactics, see 
discussion infra Epilogue.  
10  For an examination of these different opinions, see, for example, David G. Yosifon, The 
Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 181, 183–84 (2013). 
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Johnson most forcefully wrote, “[n]o corporate statute in the United States . . 
. requires a corporation to advance a particular purpose, such as profit or 
share price maximization;”11 case law has rarely addressed it and clearly has 
not mandated a particular purpose.12 
These conflicting visions of the permissible corporate purpose are not 
novel, reaching back to the early twentieth-century debates about the nature 
and scope of directors’ fiduciary obligations, most memorably the early 1930s 
debate between Adolf A. Berle, Jr. of Columbia Law School and E. Merrick 
Dodd of Harvard Law School.13 Proponents of both visions can also find 
supporting precedent in different cases throughout the past century. Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co., for example, proclaimed that “[a] business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”14 Yet, 
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons held that “moderate expenditures or contributions” 
by a corporation toward building a “church, school, library, and baths” for its 
employees “[were] directly related to the legitimate objects of the 
corporation,”15 and A. P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow suggested that “modern 
conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well 
as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they 
operate.”16 More recently, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. declared that, 
when faced with a hostile takeover bid, directors could assess, among other 
factors, the bid’s potential “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders 
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
generally),”17 but, shortly thereafter, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc. concluded that when a “break-up” or “sale” of a company “was 
inevitable,” “the duty of the board . . . [was] . . . the maximization of the 
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefits.”18 
How, if at all, can these cases (and goals) be reconciled or understood? 
Rather than assessing the merits of these seemingly inconsistent visions and 
                                                                                                                                            
11  Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate 
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432 (2013). 
12  Id. 
13  See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) 
[hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers]; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are 
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
14  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919). 
15  Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896). 
16  A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154 (1953). 
17  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
18  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).  
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cases, this article seeks to provide a new framework to examine the 
jurisprudential debates about corporate purpose. I argue that these debates 
are best described as ongoing scholarly attempts throughout the past century 
to fit corporations (and corporate law) in the broader narrative of the modern 
American state. Corporations have traditionally represented an anomaly to 
liberal legal thinkers who envisioned the world as sharply divided between 
state power and individual right holders, the ruler and the ruled. A 
corporation was both—an association of individual right holders, on the one 
hand, but an entity with state-like powers, on the other hand. For eighteenth-
century thinkers, the continued existence of corporations demonstrated the 
failure of liberal efforts to destroy the intermediate forms associated with 
medieval life. Early nineteenth-century legal doctrine eased the tension by 
dividing corporations into two different groups—public corporations that 
“assimilated to the role of the state,” such as municipal associations, and 
private corporations that “assimilated to the role of an individual in society,” 
such as business organizations.19 At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
emerging large publicly held business corporation undermined not only 
classical liberalism but also assumptions about self-interest and efficiency 
supporting classical economics.20 The scholarly debates over corporate 
purpose in the past century reflect attempts to fit this anomalous creature 
(and its management) within the narrative of the modern liberal, capitalist 
state.21  
The twentieth-century scholarly debates over the role of corporations in 
society gave rise to two paradigms for corporate law—a socio-political 
paradigm and an economic-financial one. Proponents of the socio-political 
paradigm have historically focused on the power that corporations could 
exercise in society, including over their divergent stakeholders. In turn, those 
embracing the economic-financial paradigm expressed concerns about the 
power that the control group (including but not limited to management) 
could exercise over the corporation’s shareholders, typically viewed as 
owners.  
                                                                                                                                            
19  Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1099 (1980). 
20  See, e.g., KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 189 (2009). 
21  See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 1 (1933): 
The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a 
means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there 
may be said to have evolved a “corporate system”—as there was once a feudal 
system—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers, 
and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major 
social institution.  
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As this article explores, over the course of the twentieth century, as 
scholars debated the merits of each of these paradigms and the concerns 
associated with them, judges used both paradigms to develop the law of 
corporate purpose. It rested on the twin assumptions that the modern 
American state faced internal and external threats and that corporations were 
best situated to help defend against such threats. Shareholders and other 
stakeholders’ interests were promoted only when they fit with the larger goal 
of promoting the survival of the modern American state. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, courts justified using corporate funds to benefit employees 
as a means of fighting the advance of socialism among working men and 
women. At the same time, corporations were instructed to maximize profit 
for their shareholders as a means of fighting potential manipulation of the 
stock market and the economy by the few who controlled corporations.22 In 
the midcentury years, concerns about the spread of socialism among workers 
or the power of the control group dissipated. With the rise of totalitarian 
regimes in Europe, the corporation’s purpose was to support the survival of 
American democracy by making charitable contributions to democratic 
institutions. Shareholders’ (and other stakeholders’) interests were, for the 
most part, subordinated to this end.23 In the later part of the twentieth 
century, with no real external threats to the modern American state, scholarly 
and judicial attention shifted to the market—that is, the stock market. 
Economic threats—specifically, the conglomerates that came to dominate 
corporate America and the hostile takeovers that sought to break these 
conglomerates—replaced the political threats of socialism and communism. 
Amidst rapid market growth and despite mounting demands for corporate 
action on a variety of social matters (including, among others, consumer 
safety, environmental protection, and racial equality), the courts became 
fixated on the limited goal of shareholder wealth maximization—the classical 
capitalist profit motive—as a means of ensuring the credence of the stock 
market in our global society.24  
While Dodge, Steinway, A. P. Smith, Unocal, and Revlon (which will be 
discussed in this article) made the law of corporate purpose the thread that 
wove corporations into the fabric of American society, it is important to 
stress that these cases were among the very few in which state courts 
explicitly addressed corporate purpose. As this article suggests, these cases 
represent occasions where the courts found ways to bring the academic, 
                                                                                                                                            
22  See discussion infra Part I.  
23  See discussion infra Part II.  
24  See discussion infra Part III.  
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social, and cultural sentiments of the era within the boundaries of corporate 
law. Corporate purpose was not a separate doctrine but rather one tied to (or 
incorporated within) others, be it the ultra vires doctrine in the early twentieth 
century, the enabling business judgment rule by midcentury, or the laws 
applicable to evaluating managerial responses to hostile takeovers at the 
century’s end. The want of more frequent discussions in the courts about the 
corporation’s purpose is perhaps a reflection of the state courts’ reluctance to 
critically examine the role of corporations and their managements in modern 
American society. Indeed, despite their differing rhetoric, all of these cases 
empowered management to set the corporation’s (and society’s) goals without 
interference from shareholders, other stakeholders, or the courts.  
This article is divided into three parts. The first part, Progressive Grounds, 
1900s–1930s, explores the discourse of corporate purpose in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. As large publicly held corporations came to 
dominate American markets and society, scholars expressed grave concerns 
about corporate power and viewed corporate law as a means of taming and 
restraining corporate power. Progressive scholars, especially those who 
emphasized the social and political role of the corporation, wanted corporate 
power to be exercised in trust for the community. In Steinway, the Supreme 
Court of New York, Special Term, interpreted the traditional doctrine of ultra 
vires to allow corporate managers to exercise corporate power so as to benefit 
the public good, specifically to use corporate assets to create programs that 
benefited the company’s employees so as to negate the allure of unionization 
and socialism.25 At the same time, the growing separation of ownership from 
control in the large publicly held corporation triggered concerns about 
potential market manipulation by the control group. Scholars such as Adolf 
A. Berle argued that, when conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders arise, corporate law should aim to protect the latter against the 
control group’s potential abuse of its market power.26  In Dodge, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan, concerned about concentration of wealth and control, 
embraced this argument as an exception to Steinway.27 Accordingly, 
controlling shareholders could not use their power of control to benefit 
themselves or other stakeholders’ interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  
As the second part of this article, From Ultra Vires to Business Judgment, 
1940s–1970s, explores, concerns about corporate power and market 
                                                                                                                                            
25  See discussion infra Part I.A. 
26  See discussion infra Part I.C.  
27  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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manipulation by the control group as well as socialism decreased by the 1940s 
as corporations’ war efforts and public relations campaigns helped improve 
their public image. Gradually, the goal of corporate law shifted from taming 
corporate power in the interest of the vulnerable employees or minority 
shareholders so as to ensure the success of American capitalism to channeling 
corporate power to promote the survival of American democracy. In A. P. 
Smith, the Supreme Court of New Jersey endorsed this idea by allowing 
management, even against the objection of the corporation’s shareholders, to 
make charitable contributions on behalf of the corporation. Like the Supreme 
Court of New York in Steinway, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in A. P. 
Smith found that the company’s actions were intra vires.28 However, with 
federal regulation focusing on the corporation’s impact on the community, 
the power of corporate management, rather than the power of the 
corporation, quickly became the focus of analysis. Courts moved away from 
the question of whether or not the actions of the corporation were ultra vires, 
asking instead whether or not corporate managers acted in the best interest of 
the corporation. For the most part, the interests of the shareholders (and 
other stakeholders) were subsumed under the corporate whole.29 
As the third part of this article, Hostile Takeovers and the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm, 1970s to 2000s, explains, by the 1970s and 1980s, the stock 
market, a symbol of U.S. economic power, became the focal point for 
analysis. Mainstream legal scholars and economists came to believe that the 
stock market was the most effective institution to constrain corporate 
activities. If policymakers and legal scholars in the early twentieth century 
focused on the role of the corporation in fighting socialism, and midcentury 
scholars wanted corporate managers to exercise their power for the benefit of 
American democracy, jurists in the later part of the twentieth century sought 
to ensure the survival of our market economy by focusing on the 
stockholders. With no real threats to the modern American state, the only 
perceived threat was the threat that corporations themselves could pose to 
the market economy. In the 1980s, criticism of conglomerates and fears about 
growing numbers of hostile takeovers, presumably intent on breaking down 
these large corporations, led the courts to embrace the maximization of 
wealth for the shareholders as the ultimate corporate purpose.30  
As the article concludes, throughout the twentieth century, the discourse 
of corporate purpose has served as a rhetorical tool. Courts turned to the 
                                                                                                                                            
28  See discussion infra Parts I.A. and II.A.  
29  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
30  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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corporation’s purpose to address concerns about socialism in the early 
twentieth century, communism in the midcentury years, and the success of 
the stock market at its end. In so doing, they helped make the corporation—
itself a potential challenge to classical liberalism and capitalism—these two 
ideologies’ representative institution. The early twentieth-century emphasis on 
employee benefits, the midcentury focus on charitable contributions, and the 
shareholder wealth maximization goal of the late twentieth century have 
further served to allow corporate managers to freely exercise their corporate 
power, provided that they justified their actions with reference to the ideals or 
concerns of the era. Using the rhetoric of corporate purpose, the courts 
enabled the exercise of corporate power without interference by corporate 
constituencies or the courts.  
 
I. PROGRESSIVE GROUNDS, 1900S–1930S 
 
A. Corporate Power and the Ultra Vires Doctrine 
 
A remarkable growth in the scale of private business organizations took 
place at the end of the nineteenth century. Growing consumer demand, 
increasing numbers of workers, an expanding pool of capital, and the quickly 
developing national railroads and telegraph networks enabled the creation of 
large enterprises, while corporate lawyers devised different legal tools to allow 
their clients to increase the scope of their operations so as to avoid 
destructive competition among large businesses.31 Beginning with New Jersey 
in 1888, states changed their corporate laws to “eliminate[] restrictions on . . . 
capitalization and assets, mergers and consolidation, the issuance of voting 
stock, the purpose(s) of incorporation, and the duration and locale of 
business.”32 By the late 1890s, gone were the nineteenth-century legislative 
constraints on corporations’ powers, as well as limitations on their capital 
structure. Trusts, holding companies, and mergers became common, even if 
often contested in state courts.33  
                                                                                                                                            
31  Dalia T. Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1503, 1514–15 (2006). 
32  SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: 
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996). 
33  On the development of the large publicly held corporation, and the legal changes that 
accommodated it, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65–107 (1992); see also DOUGLAS M. 
EICHAR, THE RISE AND FALL OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 20 (2017) 
(discussing the effects of competition on the development of the modern corporation); 
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Efforts to control the growing corporations, especially those attempting 
to limit corporations’ ability to consolidate, were of little consequence. A 
number of states had passed antitrust laws; in 1890, Congress passed the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and in 1898, President McKinley appointed nine 
people to the Industrial Commission to study, and hopefully solve, the trust 
problem.34 But state corporate laws aimed to fulfill the demands of industrial 
corporations, undermining state and federal antitrust regulation.35 As Lyman 
Johnson pointedly put it, “legal restrictions were curtailed and corporate 
powers were enhanced.”36 
Social scientists expressed deep concerns about the power of large 
corporations. In 1871, Thomas Cooley cautioned that state enabling laws 
allowed “the most enormous and threatening powers in our country” to 
flourish.37 Corporations, Cooley warned, were rapidly obtaining “greater 
influence in the country at large and upon the legislation of the country than 
the States to which they owe their corporate existence.”38 Similarly, in 1913, 
an article in the Yale Law Journal began by noting that “[t]he dominion of 
corporate power is greater than the general public comprehend, also the evils 
which infest these creatures of the law are skillfully and secretly destroying the 
inalienable rights of personal liberty while the people are lingering.”39 
Economists and lawyers joined in calling for national regulation, and several 
federal incorporation bills attempting to constrain the growing corporation 
were introduced in Congress during the early decades of the twentieth 
                                                                                                            
JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN INVESTORS’ 
DEMOCRACY 21 (2011) (discussing the growth of the trusts).    
34  OTT, supra note 33, at 21–27. 
35  See EICHAR, supra note 33, at 22–23 (discussing antimonopoly and anti-consolidation 
sentiments in the late 1800s); see also HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 80–90 (examining how 
the law developed to support consolidation).  
36  Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law and the History of Corporate Social Responsibility, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 570, 581 (Harwell 
Wells ed., 2018); see also EICHAR, supra note 33, at 32 (“B]y the 1870s, the large corporation 
was poised to take off. Government, however, was poorly positioned to grow in a 
corresponding fashion to mandate social responsibility.”). 
37  Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal 
Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603, 619 (1991) 
(quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 279 n.2 
(3d ed. 1874)).  
38  Id.  
39  J. Newton Baker, The Evil of Special Privilege, 22 YALE L.J. 220 (1913).  
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century; however, none were successful, leaving the regulation of corporate 
power, for the most part, in the hands of the states.40  
Before the 1880s, states regulated the activities of large corporations, 
such as banks, by narrowly describing their powers in their charters of 
incorporation.41 Private corporations were viewed as artificial entities, created 
by a charter or a grant of the state, with the charter being a privilege 
selectively conferred by the sovereign on those seeking incorporation. If the 
corporation acted outside its prescribed powers, its action was ultra vires and 
void.42 By the turn of the twentieth century, the grant or privilege paradigm 
lost much of its credibility as states encouraged incorporation in their 
territories by reducing the requirement for a state charter into a mere 
formality.43 State corporate laws no longer limited the large corporation’s 
power but rather enabled its exercise. Corporations were viewed as natural or 
real entities, separate from their members (the shareholders), their power 
almost unlimited, and their regulation, either by the states or by the federal 
government, minimal.44 
But the ultra vires doctrine did not disappear. Rather, it lived at least 
through the middle of the twentieth century, offering state courts a unique 
tool to attempt to channel corporate power toward socially beneficial goals, 
while simultaneously determining the purpose of the rapidly growing publicly 
held corporation and the power of its managers.45 Critically important at the 
end of the nineteenth century, amidst growing labor agitation, were the 
corporations’ obligations toward their employees. For one thing, the historic 
                                                                                                                                            
40  Davis, supra note 37, at 621–24; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the 
Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982). 
41  See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (1987). 
42  See, e.g., George Wharton Pepper, The Unauthorized or Prohibited Exercise of Corporate Power, 9 
HARV. L. REV. 255, 256 (1895). 
43  See, e.g., Mark, supra note 41, at 1453–54 (describing the nineteenth-century free 
incorporation movement that helped erode the idea that corporate charters were a 
privilege granted by the state); Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and 
the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 307–08 
(1979) (discussing the demise of the charter as a means of controlling corporations).  
44  On the different paradigms or visions of the corporation, see Dalia T. Mitchell, 
Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 
1870–74 (2003); see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 582 (noting that “at the start of the 
twentieth century, corporations . . . were economically powerful and regarded as legally 
distinct from their associated persons” and “they were not closely regulated (as before) by 
state corporation statutes”). 
45  For more information on the rights of shareholders to bring ultra vires suits, see Owen J. 
Roberts, The Rights of Stockholders with Reference to the Management of a Corporation, Part III, 37 
AM. L. REG. 484 (1898). 
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railroad strike of 1877—the disruption of transportation, the financial losses 
suffered by railroads across the United States, and the violent outbreaks—
exacerbated concerns about the relationship between labor and management. 
As an 1884 article entitled “Corporations, their Employees, and the Public” 
explained, as private corporations were taking on important public functions, 
the role and plight of these corporations’ wage workers, who labored to 
accomplish these functions, became highly visible.46 
Corporate leaders were keen on demonstrating their concern for their 
workers, and their commitment to improving their conditions. “The business 
corporation . . . takes millions of dollars each year and spends the money for 
the benefit of its workmen” wrote Raynal Bolling on behalf of United States 
Steel Corporation, counting among such benefits employee stock subscription 
plans, accident prevention and relief, medical care, pensions, as well as general 
community welfare.47 In his study of corporations’ public relations, Roland 
Marchand has explained that large corporations exhibited “compassionate 
concern for [their] employees” as a means of demonstrating that they 
“possessed human feeling.”48 It was also a means of fighting unionization.49 
Given that the control group and management sought to pacify the 
corporation’s employees, if only to avoid ruinous strikes, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the courts protected programs for employee benefits against 
challenges from shareholders, who could easily be described as selfishly 
motivated. In Steinway, for example, the Steinway corporation—a family 
business located in Manhattan—opened a plant in Astoria, Queens so that it 
could expand its operations and, as William Steinway, the corporation’s 
president and sole controlling shareholder, explained, “escape the 
machinations of the anarchists and socialists . . . [who] were continually 
breeding discontent among [Steinway’s] workmen, and inciting them to 
strike.”50 In order to retain its skilled labor force and circumvent potential 
strikes, “some houses had been constructed in which employees of the 
company resided . . . . [T]he company ha[d] also, at a very moderate 
expenditure, contributed specific property and money towards the 
                                                                                                                                            
46  Carl Schurz, Corporations, Their Employees, and the Public, 138 N. AM. REV. 101 (1884).   
47  Raynal C. Bolling, The United States Steel Corporation and Labor Conditions, 42 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 38, 38, 39–43 (1912); see also EICHAR, supra note 33, at 43–49 
(describing employee benefits programs at the end of the nineteenth century as “voluntary 
practices of CSR,” or corporate social responsibility). 
48  ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 
AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 15 (2000).  
49  See EICHAR, supra note 33, at 83.  
50  RICHARD K. LIEBERMAN, STEINWAY & SONS 77 (1995) (quoting William Steinway’s 
testimony before a Senate Committee on the relations between labor and capital in 1883). 
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establishment of a church, a school, a free library, and a free bath . . . .”51 An 
ongoing family feud between William Steinway and his nephew, Henry, a 
minority shareholder, resulted in several suits, including a shareholder’s suit to 
declare Steinway’s expenditures in Astoria wasteful and thus ultra vires. The 
Supreme Court of New York dismissed the suit, stating that “[t]he transfer of 
their manufactory to the Astoria site was a reasonable exercise of a conceded 
discretionary power.”52 As Judge Beekman explained: 
As . . . it involved also the transfer of a large number of 
operatives, whose well-being was essential to the proper and 
efficient performance of their work, and thus to the success 
of the corporation, a close and practical business relation 
subsisted between the provision made by the defendants for 
their employees and the object for which the corporation 
was organized . . . . It was also desirable (it may, I think, be 
said to have been necessary) to the success of the scheme 
that some provision should be made for the moral as well as 
the material needs of this new and isolated community, thus 
brought, by the exigencies of their employment, into a 
measure of social dependence upon their employer.53 
Having successfully used the rhetoric of anti-socialism, William Steinway 
was free to determine his corporation’s purpose while Steinway became a 
leading case on corporate expenditures that benefited employees. Following 
Steinway, “[e]xpenditures resulting in stimulating the employees to better work, 
and promoting faithfulness and loyalty to the employer,” were rendered 
“tributary to the promotion of corporate objects.”54 Corporations could 
maintain “relief funds” to support employees injured at work before 
Workmen’s Compensation legislation was enacted, as well as pay bonuses to 
keep up employee “morale” and encourage more “energetic efforts.”55 In 
1909, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, announced that 
“[t]he enlightened spirit of the age, based upon the experience of the past, has 
thrown upon the employer other duties, which involve a proper regard for 
                                                                                                                                            
51  Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896). But see LIEBERMAN, 
supra note 50, at 79–80 (noting that, at least in part, William Steinway, the corporation’s 
president, built “Steinway Village” so that the corporation could sell and rent homes on 
the land it owned in Queens). 
52  Steinway, 40 N.Y.S. at 721. 
53  Id.  
54  Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 136 (1931). 
55  Id. at 137–38.  
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the comfort, health, safety and well-being of the employee.”56 And in 1922, in 
Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., contributions by a corporation doing 
business in Buffalo, New York, to the endowment funds of a college and a 
university in Buffalo were deemed intra vires because they would allow for the 
creation of opportunities for business training.57 In 1931, an article in the 
Columbia Law Review concluded that courts were “more ready to adjudge 
gratuitous corporate contributions intra vires where the immediate benefit is 
received by employees than in any other situation.”58  
Also in line with Steinway, courts and state legislatures extended the 
reasoning applicable to employee benefits to “contributions to civic 
enterprises of a community dominated by the corporation,” including the 
moral needs of the community.59 Often, such expenditures also benefited the 
corporation, but, as the court stated in Steinway, they were rendered intra vires 
at least in part because “as industrial conditions change, business methods 
must change with them, and acts become permissible which, at an earlier 
period, would not have been considered to be within corporate power.”60 
Corporate law could allow corporate managers to take actions to benefit 
community goals, even if doing so was at some expense to the shareholders.  
Steinway, as the court described the facts, pitted one of the corporation’s 
shareholders against the corporation’s employees—a battle most Progressives 
(and Populists) were likely to settle in favor of the latter. Progressives were 
rather keen on ensuring that shareholders were held accountable to the 
corporation’s different stakeholders, including creditors, consumers and 
workers. At the same time, Progressives were also concerned about protecting 
individual shareholders against abuses by financiers and those in control of 
the large publicly held corporations. As the following section elaborates, 
when courts viewed the situation as involving a conflict between controlling 
and minority shareholders, they were more inclined to protect the latter and 
restrict the exercise of corporate power by the control group.  
                                                                                                                                            
56  People ex. rel. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1909).  
57  Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922). 
58  Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, supra note 54, at 136. 
59  Corporations – Charities – Statute Making Contributions to Charity by Corporations Intra Vires, 52 
HARV. L. REV. 538, 538 (1939); see also Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 
supra note 54; Am. Rolling Mill Co. v. Comm’r, 41 F.2d 314, 315–16 (6th Cir. 1930) 
(holding that a large community chest contribution to a community where about 50% of 
the corporation’s workers lived was intra vires). 
60  Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896); see also Theodore 
W. Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REV. 401 (1949) 
(explaining the rules applicable to charitable contributions). 
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B. Protecting Minority Shareholders 
 
The modern stock market developed in sync with the giant corporation. 
Beginning in the merger wave of the 1890s, corporations found ways to 
convince investors, typically of middle-class background, to invest—first, in 
bonds, and then, by the second decade of the twentieth century, in corporate 
stock.61 In the process, “the practice of investment [was linked] with national 
citizenship, democracy and the public interest.”62 As James B. Dill, the lawyer 
who drafted New Jersey’s first enabling corporate law, noted, selling shares to 
the public went “a long way to winning the loyalty of the middle classes to a 
new incorporated system of private property.”63   
These new investors had little effect on corporate affairs. Doctrinal 
changes, including the gradual erosion of the ultra vires doctrine, the 
reintroduction of the idea that the board’s power was original rather than 
delegated from the shareholders, and the elimination of the shareholders’ 
right to remove directors at will, helped minimize shareholder control.64 
Proxy voting became the norm, and states enacted laws allowing a majority of 
the shareholders to approve a sale of corporate assets, abolishing the 
nineteenth century rule requiring a unanimous vote to effect fundamental 
transactions.65 The newly legalized holding company further undermined 
shareholders’ power by allowing one corporation to control the majority of 
stock of many direct and indirect subsidiaries through pyramiding.66 
Limitations on the voting rights of certain classes of shareholders, including 
non-voting stock and conditional voting stock, also became common in the 
first decades of the twentieth century.67 As early as 1904, Thorstein Veblen 
                                                                                                                                            
61  Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1519–20.  
62  HO, supra note 20, at 180. 
63  Id. at 181. For more information on the history of the stock market, see CHARLES R. 
GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY (1997). 
64  See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 77–78, 99.  
65  Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1522; see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, 
Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 907–09 (2004) (noting how 
changes in corporate voting rules during the late nineteenth century weakened 
shareholder control).  
66  Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1526; Winkler, supra note 65, at 907. The classic treatise on the 
holding company remains JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING 
COMPANY: ITS PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION (1932). 
67  Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1526–27. For a detailed analysis of the changes described in this 
paragraph, see HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 77–90.  
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noted that “under corporate organization the owners of the industrial material 
have no voice in its management.”68 
Moreover, while share ownership became more dispersed and businesses 
grew in size, their control was concentrated. In 1913, the report of the Pujo 
(Banking and Currency) Committee announced the existence of a money 
trust, consisting of a small number of financiers sitting on multiple corporate 
boards. According to the report, these financiers controlled the economy with 
the assistance of the New York Stock Exchange, which allowed practices 
such as pooling and other stock price manipulation techniques to the 
detriment of working- and middle-class individual investors.69 In 1932, in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property—modern corporate law’s foundational 
text—Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means noted that “[o]wnership of 
wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable 
ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development.”70  
The separation of ownership from control exacerbated Progressive 
scholars’ concerns about corporate power. The multiplicity of owners created 
“tremendous aggregations of property,” which made possible such buildups 
of power (in the hands of the control group).71 The possibility of mass 
concentration of power augmented the risk of inefficient uses of power and 
the potential adverse effect of corporations on the economy at large.72  
The separation of ownership from control also rendered Progressive legal 
scholars deeply concerned about potential abuse of power by the control 
group. In 1911, an article titled Evils of Corporate Control declared that “[t]he 
facility with which capital passes under the control of strong groups of 
individuals creates one of the most serious problems of modern times.”73 In 
1927, William Z. Ripley pointed out that “the larger the number of 
shareholders, the more easily may a small concentrated block of minority 
shares exercise sway over all the rest.”74 And in 1932, when Berle and Means 
called attention to the growing separation of ownership from control in large 
                                                                                                                                            
68  THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 146 (1904). 
69  See OTT, supra note 33, at 32–33. 
70  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 69. 
71  Id. at 5. 
72  Id. Because Berle and Means’s argument focused on publicly held corporations (which 
Berle labeled quasi-public), they viewed the consolidation of power and the separation of 
ownership from control as interrelated phenomena. Id. (“The Fords and the Mellons, 
whose personal wealth is sufficient to finance great enterprises, are so few, that they only 
emphasize the dependence of the large enterprise on the wealth of more than the 
individual or group of individuals who may be in control.”). 
73  William E. Harmon, Evils of Corporate Control, 2 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y.C. 48 (1911).  
74  WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 95 (1927). 
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business corporations, they pointedly explained that individual shareholders 
lost control not only to management but also to larger investors who, even 
without owning a majority of the shares, were able to elect the board of 
directors.75 That same year, the Pecora Hearings in Congress found 
“irrefutable evidence of market manipulation by corporate officers and 
investment bankers.”76 
Calls for state and federal legislation to protect minority investors were 
heard at least since the turn of the twentieth century, becoming more vocal by 
the end of the First World War as corporations were trying to lure “citizen-
investors holding excess cash from Liberty bond, War Savings, or 
Government Savings redemptions and interest payments.”77 Courts 
supplemented such calls by holding those in control to a strict fiduciary 
obligation toward minority shareholders.78 The issue was not whether the 
exercise of corporate power was ultra vires, but rather whether the control 
group fulfilled its duties toward minority shareholders. For example, in 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, Justice Brandeis wrote:  
The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well 
settled and has been often applied. The majority has the right 
to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary 
relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation 
itself or its officers and directors. If through that control a 
sale of the corporate property is made and the property 
acquired by the majority, the minority may not be excluded 
from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale.79 
                                                                                                                                            
75  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 69–111 (detailing the changing composition of the 
control group). 
76  Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at 
the End of History, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113 (2004). A few years later, William O. 
Douglas would label the interests of investment banking houses “high finance,” charging 
that they were “interested solely in the immediate profit.” WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, The 
Forces of Disorder, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 7 (James Allen ed., 1940). According to Douglas, 
the interests of high finance were different from those of small individual shareholders, or 
even the corporation. Id. at 9. With the power of control, high finance was able to profit 
by siphoning money from other investors. Id. 
77  OTT, supra note 33, at 127.  
78  See Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?, 33 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (2011).  
79  S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1919). 
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Dodge, “[o]ne of the most famous corporate cases of all time,”80 conveyed 
a similar sentiment. In 1903, the Dodge brothers, then owners of an auto-
parts making business, entered an exclusive agreement to supply parts to the 
Ford Motor Company. At the time, Ford could not pay for the initial parts, 
and instead offered the Dodge brothers fifty shares each of the Ford Motor 
Company’s stock in exchange for their notes of $5,000 each.81 The Ford 
Motor Company was extremely successful in the following decade, and the 
Dodge brothers, as shareholders, received large amounts of special 
dividends.82 Over time, the company also reduced the price of its Model T 
car, “from $900 at the outset to $440 in 1916, each year selling more 
automobiles than the year before.”83 But in 1916, Ford had decided to stop 
paying special dividends, announcing that he intended to put the profits back 
into the company, hire more employees, and further reduce the price of Ford 
cars.84 “‘My ambition,’ said Mr. Ford, ‘is to employ still more men, to spread 
the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help 
them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the 
greatest share of our profits back in the business.’”85 The Dodge brothers, 
who by 1913 stopped making parts for the Ford Motor Company and began 
manufacturing their cars, sued, claiming that Ford’s actions turned the 
company into a semi-eleemosynary institution in violation of its charter.86 
Chief Justice Ostrander held for the Dodge brothers stating:  
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of 
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain 
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to 
the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits 
among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.87 
Why weren’t the expenditures planned by Ford in Dodge treated similarly 
to the ones in Steinway? Was the corporation not benefiting from higher 
                                                                                                                                            
80  Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 833. 
81  M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old is New 
Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 47–48 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).   
82  Miller, supra note 80, at 833. 
83  Id.  
84  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 465, 490, 505 (1919). 
85  Id. at 505. 
86  Id. at 504; Miller, supra note 80, at 835. 
87  Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398 
 
 
13:2 (2019) From Dodge to eBay 173 
morale (and less agitation) among employees? Were sales not up due to the 
reduction in car prices? Proponents of the shareholder wealth maximization 
vision of the corporation have argued that Dodge clearly stated that the 
corporation’s sole purpose was to maximize profit for the shareholders.88 
Others, however, have pointed out that the decision did not require directors 
to maximize profits for the shareholders but only limited directors’ discretion 
to share corporate profits with stakeholders other than the shareholders.89 
Most pointedly, Lynn Stout has suggested that law professors stop teaching 
the decision because it was a “mistake.”90 
Geoffrey Miller has written that “[t]he back-story, which is dimly 
apparent in the opinion itself, is that the fight between Ford and the Dodges 
had little to do with the fiduciary duties of managers and much to do with 
competition between commercial rivals.”91 A closer look at the paragraph 
including the famous quote mentioned above suggests more. The paragraph 
began with a nod to cases such as Steinway which, according to the Supreme 
Court of Michigan, raised the question as to whether “the directors were not 
acting for the best interests of the corporation.”92 “We do not draw in 
question . . . the soundness of the opinions delivered in the cases cited,” Chief 
Justice Ostrander wrote, because “[t]he case presented here [was] not like any 
of them.”93 While, according to the court, Steinway and similar cases addressed 
the duties of directors (and the corporation) toward the general public, Dodge 
focused on the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders.94 
“There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence),” Ostrander 
stressed, “of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the 
stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his 
codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders.”95 The duty to 
                                                                                                                                            
88  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A 
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993).  
89  See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 
772–75 (2005).  
90  Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166 
(2008) (noting not only that the case does not stand for the proposition that “the 
corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing shareholder wealth,” but also that it is “a 
doctrinal oddity largely irrelevant to corporate law and corporate practice”). 
91  Miller, supra note 80, at 835.  
92  Dodge, 204 Mich. at 506. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 506–07; see also D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
315–20 (1998). 
95  Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507. 
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maximize profit to the shareholders applied only in the latter context.96 As 
Ostrander was quick to emphasize:  
There is committed to the discretion of directors, a 
discretion to be exercised in good faith, the infinite details of 
business, including the wages which shall be paid to 
employees, the number of hours they shall work, the 
conditions under which labor shall be carried on, and the 
price for which products shall be offered to the public.97 
In short, Dodge’s focus on the protection of shareholders, specifically 
minority shareholders, against abuses by the control group reflected the 
common early twentieth-century concern about the power that the control 
group could exercise over the vulnerable minority shareholders (and the 
market more broadly). It was this concern that led the court to emphasize that 
“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders.”98 As the court saw it, Ford’s rhetoric of corporate social 
responsibility masked an attempt to harm the Dodge brothers, the minority 
shareholders. Unlike William Steinway’s attempt to ensure peaceful working 
conditions and fight the appeal of socialism, Ford’s rhetoric seemed to reject 
one of the most important tenets of capitalism—the profit motive.99 Fears 
about the power of concentrated control led the court to carve out an 
exception to the rule that management held the power to determine the 
corporation’s (and corporate law’s) purpose. Together, Steinway and Dodge are 
emblematic of the early twentieth-century unease with the dual problems of 
corporate power and market manipulation by the control group. Both cases 
also empowered corporate managers to determine corporate purpose 
provided that their justification did not conflict with the corporation’s 
perceived role in the modern American state. 
The decade that followed Dodge witnessed an “unprecedented influx of 
new investors into the stock market.”100 In the early part of the 1920s, 
corporations marketed their shares directly, especially to their employees and 
customers, “in the hopes of repelling unionization and federal intrusions into 
labor relations” as well as deflecting antitrust suits.101 By the second part of 
                                                                                                                                            
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  See WILLIAM PELFREY, BILLY, ALFRED, AND GENERAL MOTORS: THE STORY OF TWO 
UNIQUE MEN, A LEGENDARY COMPANY, AND A REMARKABLE TIME IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 121 (2006). 
100  OTT, supra note 33, at 169. 
101  Id. at 152. 
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the 1920s, financial firms began to encourage investment in stock “as a 
mechanism for subjecting corporate capitalism to democratic discipline.”102 
The growing numbers of individual investors exacerbated the tensions 
between the corporation’s duties to its minority shareholders and its social 
obligations.  
As the following section elaborates, in the early 1930s, the problems of 
corporate power and corporate control animated the famous debate between 
Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd. Influenced by corporate managers’ own 
assertions about their role, Dodd emphasized the corporation’s obligations 
toward the community at large. In turn, growing fears about potential abuses 
by the control group (and perhaps a more cynical view of corporate 
managers’ proclamations) led Berle to call for extending fiduciary obligations 
only toward the shareholders.  Yet, as I further argue, while Berle and Dodd 
advocated different visions of the corporation’s purpose, both viewed the 
doctrine of fiduciary obligations (rather than ultra vires) as the site where 
corporate purpose was to be found. In so doing they, perhaps inadvertently, 
helped undermine fears about corporate power. In explicitly relying upon 
management’s view of the law of corporate purpose, Dodd’s argument also 
paved the path for the courts’ midcentury endorsement of corporate 
management’s absolute discretion to determine corporate ends. 
 
C. Of Debates and Legacies 
 
Adolf Berle fully recognized the conflicting pulls of taming corporate 
power and restraining the power of management and the control group, of 
the needs of the community and the needs of the shareholders.103 As Scott 
Bowman explained, Berle saw two dimensions of corporate power: an 
internal one and an external one.104 The internal dimension focused on the 
power of corporations over individuals within them, and more specifically, 
the corporations’ power over employment decisions.105 In contrast, the 
external dimension emphasized corporations’ impact on society at large, 
particularly corporations’ power to control markets.106 In The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, the book Berle co-authored with Gardiner 
                                                                                                                                            
102  Id. at 169; see also JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 189–97 (1997). 
103  See C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective 
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77, 87 (2002).  
104  BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 207; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 7. 
105  BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 207. 
106  Id. at 208. 
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Means, Berle was especially concerned about corporate power and the 
challenge that corporations presented to classical liberal thought.107 The book 
concluded by proclaiming that shareholders, “by surrendering control and 
responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the 
corporation should be operated in their sole interest,—they have released the 
community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in 
the doctrine of strict property rights.”108 Accordingly: 
Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a 
program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable 
service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of 
which would divert a portion of the profits from the owners 
of passive property, and should the community generally 
accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution of 
industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners would 
have to give way.109 
A year earlier, however, in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, Berle 
announced that corporate powers should be exercised in trust for the 
shareholders.110 Just as with Steinway and Dodge, Berle’s seemingly 
contradicting positions were grounded in the dual concerns about corporate 
power and corporate control and their implication for the modern American 
state. It was Dodd’s article, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, the only 
public response to Berle’s article, which polarized Berle’s vision and the 
twentieth century’s discourse of corporate purpose.111 
Dodd’s vision of corporate management was one of public service. Dodd 
wanted to validate corporate social policies that benefited different 
constituencies, including employees, consumers, investors and the community 
at large, even when such policies resulted in diminution of profits for the 
shareholders.112 Announcing that he was “thoroughly in sympathy with Mr. 
Berle’s efforts to establish a legal control which [would] more effectually 
prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into their own pockets 
from those of stockholders,” Dodd stated that the corporation nonetheless 
had “social service as well as a profit-making function.”113  
                                                                                                                                            
107  See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21. 
108  Id. at 355. 
109  Id. at 356 (emphasis added). 
110  See Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 13.  
111  See Dodd, supra note 13. 
112  Id.  
113  Id. at 1147–48. 
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To support his argument, Dodd relied upon statements made by 
corporate managers, particularly Owen D. Young, chairman of the board and 
president of General Electric. Young, who believed that “life insurance, 
company health care, mortgage assistance, and worker grievance boards,” 
could “nurture employee loyalty, and most importantly, avoid unions,”114 
argued that the corporation should recognize its “public obligations and 
perform its public duties—in a word, vast as it is, that it should be a good 
citizen.”115 Similarly, Dodd noted that, in giving charters to corporations, the 
state had created “e pluribus unum”—“[i]f the unity of the corporate body is 
real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that 
the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual 
members, that they are . . . trustees for an institution rather than attorneys for 
the stockholders.”116 
As the above quote from The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
indicates, Berle did not disagree. Yet, his argument in Corporate Powers as Powers 
in Trust focused elsewhere, drawing upon Berle’s earlier work on the 
relationship between directors, officers and individual shareholders and the 
need to eliminate the potential for market manipulation by the control 
group.117 In 1925, Berle called attention to the fact that because management 
stock would likely be controlled by the investment banking house that served 
as a promoter for the corporation, “it [was] possible, if not probable, that 
there [would] be attractive opportunities for manipulation of securities, for 
negotiating favorable contracts with allied interests, or even for giving value 
to stock which represent[ed] no real investment.”118 According to Berle, given 
the “web of economic interests” that the investment banking house served 
and from which it made its profits, it was likely that management stock would 
be voted for transactions that benefited the investment banking house, or 
even the controlling groups, but not the controlled corporation.119 
In 1931, wishing himself to be the “Marx of the shareholder class,”120 
Berle wanted to protect those not in control of the corporate machinery from 
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fraud and manipulative practices that seemed to plague the securities markets. 
He wanted to rein in the power of the control group. The article Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust focused on the power to issue stock, the power to 
declare dividends, the power to amend the charter, and the power to engage 
in fundamental transactions.121 While the courts had previously considered 
each of these powers a matter of contract law and thus susceptible to 
statutory changes (and the possibility of opting out), Berle wanted to make 
these powers a matter of the control group’s trusteeship duties.122  
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle’s analysis focused on 
corporate power, and his conclusions were similar to Dodd’s. However, Berle 
was concerned about “the apparently unlimited powers conferred on 
corporate management by recently enacted corporation statutes and charter 
provisions.”123 He also had little faith in the assertions made by corporate 
managers regarding their role. Young, whose ideas influenced Dodd’s 
writings, developed the rhetoric of trust to convey that management was a 
profession that could mediate the different interests involved in the corporate 
endeavor.124 Yet, while Young described business managers as trustees for 
society, he also argued that, as a result, they required little if any supervision 
from the states or the federal government.125 As Allen Kaufman and 
Lawrence Zacharias have noted, “[t]he business community would not fully 
live up to Young’s expectations; but it did take advantage of Young’s trustee 
argument,” with “managers represent[ing] themselves through Young’s 
model.”126 
Recognizing the limits of the business community’s trustee argument, 
Berle pointed out that “[t]he industrial ‘control’ does not now think of himself 
as a prince; he does not now assume responsibilities to the community; his 
bankers do not now undertake to recognize social claims; his lawyers do not 
advise him in terms of social responsibility.”127 Lessening the control group’s 
obligations toward the shareholders would thus make the power of control 
absolute. As Berle put it, “[y]ou can not abandon the emphasis on ‘the view 
that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for 
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their stockholders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and 
reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”128  
Given that the Berle-Dodd debate has since been viewed as the beginning 
point for discussions of corporate purpose, it is easy to lose track of the 
definition of corporate purpose as it was in the early 1930s, shortly after the 
stock market crash. The differences between Berle’s and Dodd’s positions are 
significant, but the similarities are also important. Both were concerned about 
corporate power and the means to discipline it.129 Both also placed trust, not 
ultra vires, at the center of the law of corporate purpose. Stringent fiduciary 
obligations were to supplement federal regulation and state legislation to 
ensure that corporate power was exercised to achieve socially acceptable 
goals, be it community welfare or minority shareholder protection.130 The 
doctrine of ultra vires had allowed Progressive legal scholars and judges in the 
early decades of the twentieth century to embrace the duties of corporations 
toward their employees and the duties of corporate managers toward the 
shareholders as complementary. Both Berle and Dodd began to alter this 
framework by shifting the debates away from ultra vires toward fiduciary 
obligations.  
In the end, the idea that corporate law’s purpose was to enforce 
trusteeship duties was very short-lived. Partially because scholars offered 
different visions as to whom directors were trustees and provided no concrete 
plan as to how the idea of trust would be implemented, partially because the 
business community used the concept of trust to promote its own agenda, 
and partially because the courts have struggled at least since the mid-
nineteenth century to define the role of the board of directors, the idea did 
not take hold in state courts.131 
The early twentieth-century concerns about corporate power and control 
also dissipated shortly after the Berle-Dodd debate. As the following part 
explores, by the late 1930s, concerns about socialism and unionization waned, 
and the law of corporate purpose became entangled with a new discourse of 
democracy that came to dominate the social sciences beginning in the 1940s. 
A vision of corporations as quintessentially American substantiated this 
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discourse. In this context, the courts not only relied upon management’s own 
vision of its obligations to develop a purpose for corporate law and 
corporations but also used the developing business judgment rule to make 
management’s (almost) absolute discretion the foundation of corporate law.  
 
 
 
 
II. FROM ULTRA VIRES TO BUSINESS JUDGMENT, 1940S–1970S 
 
A. The Charitable Corporation 
 
The programs adopted during the first phase of the New Deal aimed to 
bring relief and recovery through government planning and coordination.132 
These programs were grounded in the realization, as Louis Jaffe put it, that 
“the most significant and powerful components of the social structure [were] 
economic groups, competing and complementary in varying degrees;”133 their 
thrust was to curb ruinous competition among business and instead achieve 
cooperation through governmental coordination.134 As Means put it, the goal 
was not to “make the market effective as a coordinator,” which would have 
required “revers[ing] the trend of a century and break[ing] the large units into 
a multitude of smaller enterprises.”135 Rather, the early New Deal programs 
were designed to keep in place the large units and increase “the element of 
administrative coordination of economic activity rather than its 
elimination.”136  
Neither the business community nor advocates of broader corporate 
reforms celebrated the early New Deal programs, be it the Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934 or the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Progressive 
reformers believed these programs were insufficient solutions to the 
problems that plagued the economy, while the business community feared 
potential liability, especially under the Securities Acts.137 Within a few years, 
however, these programs helped alleviate the fears about corporate power 
and the power of control that characterized the early decades of the twentieth 
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century.138 In regulating the corporation’s dealings with its shareholders and 
its creditors, the Securities Acts alleviated earlier concerns about market 
manipulation by the control group.139 At the same time, the Federal Trade 
Commission guaranteed consumers “fair” competition, while the National 
Labor Relations Act ensured that workers had the power to bargain 
collectively.140 
After the unexpected economic recession of 1937, New Dealers 
abandoned their regulatory vision of the modern state and instead adopted a 
compensatory vision. They no longer wanted the federal government to 
coordinate economic activity, but rather envisioned the government as 
redressing the “weaknesses and imbalances in the private economy without 
directly confronting the internal workings of capitalism.”141 The state was to 
“manage the economy without managing the institutions of the economy.”142 
As President Roosevelt put it, the government’s role was to spend capital “to 
increase [the] public wealth and to build up the health and strength of the 
people,” in order “to help [the] system of private enterprise to function.”143 A 
vision of a free market, compensated by the state’s fiscal hand on rare 
occasions, began to dominate economic thought.144 
At the same time, the public image of corporations and their 
managements was changing. War production and the development of new 
industries (particularly electronics and communications) helped eliminate 
corporate debt, allowed corporations to cut prices, introduced new 
management techniques, and made corporations more likely to assume public 
responsibilities.145 Corporations were embraced as dominant economic, social 
and political institutions. The concerns of earlier decades were forgotten, and 
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the alliance between business and the federal government was 
strengthened.146 No longer a potential threat to the modern American state, 
the publicly held corporation became its quintessential institution. In 1946, 
Peter Drucker wrote that the corporation was not merely an economic 
organization, but “[America’s] representative social institution.”147 As such, it 
strove to fulfill “the aspirations and beliefs of the American people.”148 For 
one thing, General Motors, the focus of Drucker’s study of the corporation, 
proclaimed its intent to spend $500 million on products and facilities to meet 
the needs of the American public after the war.149 The corporation, Drucker 
wrote, was “the institution which sets the standard for the way of life and the 
mode of living of our citizens; which leads, molds and directs; which 
determines our perspective on our own society; around which crystallize our 
social problems and to which we look for their solution.”150 
Social demands on corporations changed, too. In the early decades of the 
twentieth century, courts used the doctrine of the implied powers of the 
corporation to help channel corporate power toward socially beneficial goals, 
specifically to justify corporations’ contributions to the needs and morale of 
their employees even when the benefits to the corporation were indirect.151 
But in the postwar years, with federal programs to protect employees and no 
real fears about labor unrest, the discourse of corporate purpose was no 
longer focused on the needs and morale of the corporation’s employees. 
Instead, attention shifted to charitable contributions.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, there were few, if any, statutes 
authorizing corporate charitable contributions.152 Such contributions were 
deemed ultra vires unless the corporation received a benefit.153 Dodge, discussed 
in the previous part, has indeed been described as a case in which charitable 
contributions were rejected because the corporation did not receive such a 
benefit.154  
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In the 1920s, state corporation laws began to allow corporations to make 
charitable contributions while Congress extended to corporations “the right 
to deduct charitable contributions from gross income.”155 By 1949, thirteen 
states had passed legislation sanctioning corporate charitable contributions, 
albeit with specific restrictions, including limits on the allowed annual 
amounts of such contributions.156 By 1950, a provision allowing corporate 
philanthropy was included in the Model Business Corporation Act; it 
permitted “donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes; and in time of war.”157 Many states adopted similar 
provisions in their corporation laws.158  
It was not long before state courts were called upon to evaluate the merit 
and legal propriety of these statutes and of corporate charitable contributions 
and corporate purpose more broadly. In 1951, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, seeking a court resolution on the propriety of corporate 
contributions to higher education, brought a test case before the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in which A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company (“A. P. 
Smith”) sought a judgment declaring such contributions intra vires.159  
A. P. Smith was incorporated in 1896 for the “manufacture and sale of 
valves, fire hydrants and special equipment, mainly for water and gas 
industries.”160 “Over the years the company has contributed regularly to the 
local community chest and on occasions to Upsala College in East Orange 
and Newark University, now part of Rutgers, the State University.”161 Then, 
in July of 1951, the board of directors of A. P. Smith determined that it was 
“in the corporation’s best interests to join with others in the 1951 Annual 
Giving to Princeton University,” and authorized the transfer of 1,500 dollars 
to the university “as a contribution towards its maintenance.”162 Mr. Hubert 
F. O’Brien, the company’s president, asserted that “he considered the 
contribution to be a sound investment, that the public expects corporations 
to aid philanthropic and benevolent institutions, that they obtain good will in 
the community by so doing, and that their charitable donations create 
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favorable environment for their business operations.”163 O’Brien further 
testified that “in contributing to liberal arts institutions, corporations were 
furthering their self-interest in assuring the free flow of properly trained 
personnel for administrative and other corporate employment.”164  
O’Brien’s testimony echoed the sentiment of the business community. In 
1947, a report by the Commission on Higher Education noted the 
importance of institutions of higher education “for economic opportunity 
and political freedom,” and stressed the need for private giving as well as 
federal aid to sustain these institutions.165 Concerned about growing federal 
(administrative) involvement, business “heavyweights” actively promoted 
“business support of higher education [as] infinitely preferable to federal 
aid.”166 Corporations were “urged to displace the Federal Government” in 
“meeting the financial needs of higher education.”167 Other corporate leaders 
chimed in to support O’Brien’s testimony: 
Mr. Frank W. Abrams, chairman of the board of the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, testified that 
corporations are expected to acknowledge their public 
responsibilities in support of the essential elements of our 
free enterprise system. . . . Mr. Irving S. Olds, former 
chairman of the board of the United States Steel 
Corporation, pointed out that corporations have a self-
interest in the maintenance of liberal education as the 
bulwark of good government. . . . Similarly, Dr. Harold W. 
Dodds, President of Princeton University . . . stated that 
“democratic society will not long endure if it does not 
nourish within itself strong centers of non-governmental 
fountains of knowledge, opinions of all sorts not 
governmentally or politically originated.”168 
The New Jersey Supreme Court could have resolved the matter without 
reference to this testimony. A 1930 statutory provision permitted New Jersey 
corporations to make charitable contributions.169 A. P. Smith was formed in 
1896, more than three decades before the provision was enacted. Yet, as the 
Court noted, “[f]ifty years before the incorporation of The A. P. Smith 
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Manufacturing Company [the New Jersey] Legislature provided that every 
corporate charter thereafter granted ‘shall be subject to alteration, suspension 
and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.’ . . . A similar reserved power 
was placed into [the New Jersey] Constitution in 1875.”170 Due to this 
reservation of power provision, the 1930 legislation could apply, retroactively, 
to A. P. Smith.171 
Justice Jacobs preferred to make a broader statement, one that reached 
beyond statutory interpretation. While referencing the statutory provisions 
toward the end of his decision, Justice Jacobs, in deference to business leaders 
and university officials, chose to offer an exposé of the corporation’s role 
(and corporate purpose) in midcentury American society. Relying on 
testimony of O’Brien and other business leaders, the court noted the 
important role corporations played in American history:  
During the first world war corporations loaned their 
personnel and contributed substantial corporate funds in 
order to insure survival; during the depression of the ‘30s 
they made contributions to alleviate the desperate hardships 
of the millions of unemployed; and during the second world 
war they again contributed to insure survival. They now 
recognize that we are faced with other, though nonetheless 
vicious, threats from abroad which must be withstood 
without impairing the vigor of our democratic institutions at 
home and that otherwise victory will be pyrrhic indeed. 
More and more they have come to recognize that their 
salvation rests upon sound economic and social environment 
which in turn rests in no insignificant part upon free and 
vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning.172 
Justice Jacobs’ reference to “our democratic institutions at home” and his 
insistence that corporations were the foundation upon which American 
democracy could thrive173 reflected the midcentury obsession with democratic 
theory. As Morton Horwitz has explained, in the 1940s, democracy emerged 
“as a basic concept in American constitutional law” as American social 
scientists wondered why and how “America had managed to avoid 
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succumbing to European totalitarianism.”174 In 1953, when A. P. Smith was 
decided, the Korean War and the Cold War, more broadly, were vicious 
“threats from abroad which must be withstood without impairing the vigor of 
our democratic institutions at home.”175 Just as political and legal theorists 
struggled to explain the contrast between democratic and non-democratic 
societies, corporations (and their managers) were quick to claim their unique 
role in ensuring the survival of the former. As two members of the 
Pennsylvania Bar succinctly put it two decades later: “As money and power 
have become concentrated in corporate enterprises, those enterprises have 
become an increasingly critical source of funds for public works, and 
corporate decisions have come increasingly to determine the quality of 
American life. This has not been overlooked by the managers or by the 
courts.”176 
A. P. Smith examined the question of charitable contributions using the 
rapidly disappearing nineteenth-century doctrine of ultra vires, a doctrine 
focused on corporate power. Viewed as critical for ensuring the survival of 
American democracy, charitable contributions were not only intra vires but 
also best left to managerial discretion. Management could choose to make 
certain contributions, despite shareholders’ disapproval, but it was not 
required to do so, even if the shareholders so wished. Corporations and their 
managements were free to exercise their power, with or without their 
shareholders’ consent. In 1954, two decades after his public deliberation with 
Dodd, Berle asserted that Dodd had won the debate.177 As Berle, perhaps 
cynically, put it, corporations had developed a conscience; “modern directors 
[were] not limited to running business enterprise for maximum profit, but 
[were] in fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community 
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system.”178 Corporate managers’ authority to run the corporation could not 
be challenged.  
Corporations were not equipped to determine social priorities and lacked 
any democratic authority to do so,179 but the statements of corporate leaders 
insinuated that responsible corporate management could reconcile the 
corporation’s interest with the public good and help the nation.180 The 
endorsement of such statements by the judiciary helped consolidate and 
legitimate corporate power against internal and external challenges. As the 
following section elaborates, in endorsing the vision that corporate leaders 
articulated for corporations, the courts also helped substantiate the ideology 
of managerialism that came to characterize corporate law in the midcentury 
years. With managerialism, questions involving corporate purpose were no 
longer examined using the ultra vires framework; rather, they were subsumed 
within the doctrines of management’s fiduciary obligations and business 
judgment. Concerns about the power of the control group or management 
disappeared. Corporate managers’ decisions regarding the corporation’s goals 
were almost guaranteed to be upheld, provided that they did not constitute a 
waste of corporate assets.  
 
B. The Socially Responsible Managerial Class  
 
By the 1940s and 1950s, expert management became the “strategic 
center” of the large publicly held corporation.181 While shareholders grew 
numerous (and passive), management took center stage. As Richard 
Hofstadter pointed out, “business structure has brought into being a 
managerial class of immense social and political as well as market power.”182 
Management dominated the corporate bureaucracy, organized production, 
and exercised power over individual lives within the corporation and market 
transactions outside it.183 The term “free enterprise,” in use since the 1930s, 
became associated with the free reign of managers who, in the cultural 
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imagination, replaced the small produces and entrepreneurs of the nineteenth 
century.184 
Business experts asserted that corporations were to be managed by 
multiple loyal leaders, “men of ability and initiative” capable of fighting or 
evading “bureaucratic ossification and bureaucratic timidity” and pursuing 
corporate policy.185 Drawing on his study of General Motors, Peter Drucker 
concluded that corporations should combine “corporate unity” with 
“divisional autonomy and responsibility,” and aim to realize “unity through 
local self-government and vice versa.”186 Senior managers were viewed as 
capable of balancing the different needs of the corporation’s various divisions 
and constituencies, and Drucker stressed the need to free management from 
“legal subservience to both shareholders and directors.”187 
According to Drucker, General Motors was a successful model of 
genuine federalism. General Motors did not have “a clear division of 
powers,” but what the corporation lacked in centralized authority, efficient 
markets corrected.188 The freedom and flexibility exercised by divisional 
management was constrained by the objective framework of “modern 
methods of cost accounting and market analysis as an impersonal yardstick to 
measure achievement of both policy-makers and production men.”189 
Departments such as consumer relations, dealer relations, and community 
relations were instrumental in keeping corporate executives in touch with 
their communities and the corporation’s broader social and economic role.190 
Still, the most important characteristic of a successful organization was its 
leadership. Drucker believed that “[t]he ability of an institution to produce 
leaders is more important than its ability to produce efficiently and 
cheaply.”191 As he explained, “without an able, responsible and enterprising 
                                                                                                                                            
184  See, e.g., Daniel Bell, The Power Elite—Reconsidered, 64 AM. J. SOC. 238, 247 (1958) 
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rests on its “indispensable function”); Davita Silfen Glasberg & Michael Schwartz, 
Ownership and Control of Corporations, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 311, 313 (1983) (discussing 
“managerial theory[’s]” description of a class of corporate leaders free from “outside 
pressures” with “unconstrained power” and without the incentive to “misuse” it).  
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leadership, willing and capable of taking the initiative, the most efficient 
institution cannot maintain its efficiency, let alone increase it.”192 
Social and political critics pointed to the power inequities that permeated 
American corporations in the postwar years and that were reinforced by the 
celebration of managerialism. C. Wright Mills decried “the rise of an elite of 
power” whose “decisions . . . carry more consequences for more people than 
has ever been the case in the world history of mankind.”193 According to 
Mills, the postwar years witnessed “[t]he top of the American system of 
power . . . [becoming] much more unified and much more powerful, the 
bottom . . . much more fragmented, and in truth, impotent.”194 And Gabriel 
Kolko described the regulatory laws of the Progressive era as reflecting the 
efforts of conservative corporate leaders to maintain the social and political 
status quo amidst changing economic conditions.195 The modern American 
state was accordingly the result of business efforts to explain capitalism in a 
way that allowed the corporate elite to maximize their profits.196  
But even staunch critics were not able to undermine the general 
acceptance of managerialism. Worried about totalitarianism, and later, the 
Cold War, the majority of midcentury scholars discounted concerns about 
business and its potential threat to democracy and instead assumed a 
harmonious relationship between corporations, corporate managers, and 
society.197 At the 1956 meeting of the American Economic Association, 
economist Carl Kaysen noted that “[t]he modern corporation is a soulful 
corporation”198: 
No longer the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize 
return on investment, management sees itself as responsible 
to stockholders, employees, customers, the general public, 
and, perhaps most important, the firm itself as an institution. 
. . . [Moreover, its] responsibilities to the general public are 
widespread: leadership in local charitable enterprises, 
concern with factory architecture and landscaping, provision 
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of support for higher education, and even research in pure 
science, to name a few.199 
Business leaders were quick to pronounce their commitment to fulfilling 
their managerial role. In 1927, Owen Young told his audience that managers 
had a special obligation to serve the public interest.200 In the postwar years, 
managers saw themselves as the “neutral, honest brokers in distributional 
battles among the firm’s various contractual stakeholders” and viewed 
corporate internal hierarchies as “sustain[ing] their neutrality and ensur[ing] 
their expertise.”201 The Harvard Business School’s alumni association 
proclaimed that management acted as trustees to the “employees, investors, 
consumers, and government,” while Fortune magazine reported that managers 
were “conducting the ‘affairs of the enterprise in such a way as to maintain an 
equitable and working balance among the claims of the various directly interested 
groups—stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large.’”202  
State courts fully embraced the managerial class as the promoter of 
socially beneficial goals. The scholarly obsession with democracy, mentioned 
above, not only helped legitimate the large publicly held corporation; it also 
helped secure the position of corporate management. For one thing, courts 
rejected the idea of direct shareholder participation in corporate affairs, and in 
its place embraced an ideal of representative democracy.203 Shareholders were 
expected to elect directors, who would choose managers to “execute the 
general policies laid down by the directors.”204 However, shareholders could 
not order or command the directors or managers. So that corporations could 
continue to play their social role, management’s discretion, including its 
prerogative to determine the corporation’s social responsibilities, could not be 
limited by reference to the shareholders’ wishes (or objections).205 
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As Gerald Frug explained, managers were seen as the shareholders’ 
representatives who, while “not amenable to direct shareholder control, 
nevertheless serve[d] shareholder interests.”206 The “shareholder interest” was 
not determined by reference to shareholders’ subjective, and potentially 
conflicting, desires; rather, it was an “objectified abstraction,” determined by 
the fiduciaries, “the bureaucratic managers,” and “attributed to all 
shareholders of all corporations whether they want it or not.”207 Fears about 
potential abuse of power by management dissipated. Management had full 
discretion to determine the “shareholder interest” while “shareholder 
interest” presumably constrained management’s power. By relying on this 
circularity of power and restraint, courts helped legitimate corporate and 
management power in the second part of the twentieth century.208  
With this understanding of the appropriate roles for shareholders and 
managers, the courts stopped using the ultra vires doctrine to analyze cases 
involving the exercise of corporate power to achieve goals other than profit 
maximization for the shareholders. Accepting, as A. P. Smith did, that 
corporate power included the power to engage in actions that were beneficial 
to society,209 the courts examined only whether, in exercising their power, 
corporate managers fulfilled their fiduciary obligations. In so doing, the courts 
ensured that decisions regarding corporate purpose would fall under the 
protective presumption of the business judgment rule.   
Take, for example, Shlensky v. Wrigley, a derivative suit brought by a 
minority stockholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. (a 
Delaware corporation that owned and operated the Chicago Cubs) against the 
corporation’s directors as well as its controlling shareholder and president, 
Philip K. Wrigley.210 The plaintiff claimed that the Chicago Cubs were 
suffering losses, in part, because the directors had consistently refused to 
install lights at Wrigley Field and schedule night baseball games.211 (Wrigley 
Field, the Cubs’ home park, was also owned by the corporation.) As the 
plaintiff saw it: 
Wrigley has refused to install lights, not because of interest 
in the welfare of the corporation but because of his personal 
opinions “that baseball is a ‘daytime sport’ and that the 
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installation of lights and night baseball games will have a 
deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.”212 
The Illinois Supreme Court saw matters differently. Referencing Dodge, 
upon which the plaintiff relied, the court concluded that it was “not satisfied 
that the motives assigned to Philip K. Wrigley, and through him to the other 
directors, are contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the 
stockholders.”213 The issue was simply one of business judgment, and the 
court would not intervene without a show of “fraud, illegality or conflict of 
interest.”214 
With respect to charitable contributions, the shift toward business 
judgment began with the Chancery Court of Delaware’s decision in Theodora 
Holding Company v. Henderson.215 The case involved a corporation seeking to 
make a gift of about two percent of its total income to a charitable trust 
“authorized to operate exclusively in the fields of ‘religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals.’”216 Despite the fact that the trust was controlled by the 
controlling shareholder (and director) of the contributing corporation, the 
court declared it to be valid because it was reasonable.217 Vice-Chancellor 
Marvel stated that “the test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift 
such as the one here in issue is that of reasonableness, a test in which the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by 
corporations furnish a helpful guide.”218 
Beyond reasonableness, the decision to allow corporate management to 
pursue such charitable contributions was grounded in the court’s 
understanding of the law of corporate purpose. As Vice-Chancellor Marvel 
put it:  
It is . . . obvious, in my opinion, that the relatively small loss 
of immediate income otherwise payable to . . . the corporate 
defendant’s . . . stockholders, had it not been for the gift in 
question, is far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing 
from the placing of such gift in channels where it serves to 
benefit those in need of philanthropic or educational 
                                                                                                                                            
212  Id. at 778.  
213  Id. at 779–80. 
214  Id. at 780. 
215  Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404–05 (Del. Ch.1969). 
216  Id. at 404. 
217  Id. at 406. 
218  Id. at 405. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398 
 
 
13:2 (2019) From Dodge to eBay 193 
support, thus providing justification for large private 
holdings, thereby benefiting plaintiff in the long run.219 
Of particular importance, according to Marvel, was the fact that the 
charitable foundation that received the contribution was working “towards 
the rehabilitation and education of deprived but deserving young people.”220 
Such work, Marvel noted, was “peculiarly appropriate in an age when a large 
segment of youth is alienated even from parents who are not entirely satisfied 
with our present social and economic system.”221  
In 1971, reviewing Shlensky and Theodora among other cases, Carroll 
Wetzel and James Winokur concluded that management was free to pursue 
social goals, reaching further than charitable contributions. As they noted:  
[T]o the extent that corporate executives wish, for example, 
to meet social responsibilities by extra recruitment in 
minority communities, or development of safer, less 
polluting manufacturing techniques and final products, such 
decisions will probably enjoy the same judicial sympathy as 
have corporate gifts. This is not to say that the profit motive 
has been expunged from the law books but that, if history is 
any guide, the courts can be expected to take a broad and 
sympathetic view of new efforts by corporate managers to 
solve new problems.222 
Wetzel and Winokur’s analysis reached further. Recognizing the growing 
trend in state courts (especially in Delaware) to uphold decisions of corporate 
managers,223 they noted that “to the extent that corporate managers are 
responsive to the needs of the time as those needs become apparent, the 
‘business judgment’ rule will grow in corresponding vigor for their 
protection.”224 When, in Kahn v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
finally found an opportunity to opine on the matter, it too embraced the 
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reasonableness test, adding that the business judgment rule would likely 
protect a board’s decision to make a charitable contribution.225  
As the following part explores, by the time Kahn was decided, several 
forces had already converged diametrically to alter the midcentury 
understanding of corporate purpose. Rising numbers of shareholders, 
increasing demands on corporations to act in socially responsible ways, and 
growing criticisms of the ideology of managerialism coupled with a fresh 
interest in the role of the board of directors changed the contours of 
corporate law. Yet, perhaps the most significant development affecting the 
law of corporate purpose was the rising number of hostile takeovers during 
the 1980s. Amidst mounting calls for imposing social duties on corporations, 
the hostile takeovers helped focus corporate law on the maximization of 
profit for the shareholders. Still, as Kahn itself illustrates, the rhetoric of 
wealth maximization was typically used not to enrich the shareholders but to 
empower corporate managers to determine their corporation’s ends without 
limitation or interference by the courts.  
 
III. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
MAXIMIZATION NORM, 1970S TO 2000S 
 
A. Changing Tides   
 
Through the 1950s, stock ownership was not widespread—less than 5% 
of the population owned stock—and corporations relied upon earnings and, 
to a more limited extent, external financing from banks to fund their 
operations.226 Trading volume was also low, indicating that these shareholders 
preferred long-term investment for appreciation and income.227 In 1954, 
riding the waves of “patriotism and renewed appreciation of capitalism” that 
characterized the 1950s, the NYSE embarked upon a campaign for mass 
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marketing stock as a means, among others, to fight communism, socialism 
and fascism.228 As NYSE President G. Keith Funston explained: 
We have learned that capitalism functions best when 
ownership of the means of production is not confined to the 
wealthy few but is spread through the land. The idea of 
public ownership of industry is not an endorsement of 
socialism or nationalization but the hope that all the 
people—factory workers, housewives, farmers, lawyers—can 
own a share in a business enterprise. That is democratic 
capitalism. It is our job to help make it work.229 
Titled “Own Your Share of American Business,” the campaign used 
sophisticated advertising tools that did not focus on political ideologies but 
rather on associating investment in stock with steady income, gradually 
“transforming many citizens’ image of equity investing from a sinful, foolish 
pursuit akin to gambling to a wholesome activity as quintessentially American 
as . . . apple pie.”230 The bullish market growth in the succeeding decade 
confirmed the success of the NYSE’s campaign.231 
The development of modern finance theory coincided with the NYSE 
efforts. In the first part of the twentieth century, as corporations sought to 
create a market for their stock, economists justified investment by reference 
to the intrinsic value of corporations. Beginning in the 1950s, however, the 
newly developed modern portfolio theory suggested that investors could 
create “an efficient portfolio,” that is, a portfolio that would achieve 
maximum return by diversifying non-systematic risk, and that the portfolio, 
rather than individual corporations, should be the focus 
of investment analysis.232 The Capital Asset Pricing Model, which was 
developed in the 1960s, offered a regression analysis of a stock’s historical 
movement in relation to the market to help investors diversify even the 
systematic risk inherent in the market. Rather than study the fundamentals of 
companies in which they were interested, investors were advised to study the 
historical performance of their companies’ stock price.233 As Ronald Gilson 
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and Jeffrey Gordon have demonstrated, the need to ensure ample 
diversification of both systematic and non-systematic risks led investors to 
choose mutual funds over direct investment in corporate stock; within a few 
decades, the percentage of households that owned equities through mutual 
funds dramatically increased.234 
The bull market through the late 1960s helped keep the growing numbers 
of investors satisfied. In the 1970s, however, for the first time since the early 
New Deal, the publicly held corporation came under “searching public 
scrutiny” with “widespread complaint that corporations have become cavalier 
about consumer interests . . . largely indifferent to social deterioration around 
them, and . . . dangerous polluters of the environment.”235 Demands on 
corporations to fulfill social and political goals widely intensified. 
Corporations were expected to help eliminate poverty, provide health care, 
promote ethnic and racial equality, offer educational opportunities, ensure 
safer products and safer work places, and protect the environment, even if 
such actions lowered profits.236 When inflation and “unfavorable balance of 
trade” affected the nation, corporations were called upon to adopt “voluntary 
restraints on prices, on imports of goods and on the export of capital.”237 
The new investors, especially the growing number of institutional 
investors, found a new role. Public interest shareholder groups used the 
SEC’s proxy and shareholder proposal rules to address corporate practices 
related to the Vietnam War, environmental protection, occupational safety, 
and equal employment.238 The Project on Corporate Responsibility (the 
“Project”), which owned twelve shares of stock of General Motors (“GM”), 
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was the first among many such attempts.239 The Project was formed by four 
lawyers, who, with Ralph Nader’s support, asked GM’s management to 
include nine proposals in the company’s proxy solicitation.240 These proposals 
addressed product quality and safety, working conditions, environmental 
protection, and affirmative action.241 Other organizations followed the 
Project’s example. Church groups and institutional investors mounted 
campaigns to ensure equal employment opportunities, stop plant closing, 
prevent environmental pollution, and divest from “countries with 
controversial human rights records, energy conservation, nuclear power and 
nuclear weapons.”242 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), 
which was established in 1972 by a group of institutional investors who were 
trying to assess how to vote on these new resolutions, “counted 38 social 
responsibility resolutions coming to votes in 1973, 72 in 1974, 83 in 1975 and 
133 in 1976.”243  
The demands on corporations and their management were many, but 
their unifying theme was simple and familiar. The corporation was seen as 
affecting different segments of society, not only its investors. Its power was 
deemed public rather than private. Social, cultural and economic groups 
affected by the corporation wanted a say in its direction.244 According to 
proponents of corporate social responsibility, so that the corporation could 
maintain its legitimacy in American society, “the social and economic groups 
affected by the corporation” had to “participate in the corporate decision-
making process.”245 
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In 1971, a report by the Committee for Economic Development pointed 
out that, in the first half of the twentieth century, workers, consumers and 
investors were seen as the corporations’ constituencies.246 Corporations could 
thus meet their perceived social responsibilities simply by “generating . . . 
economic growth,”247 which  led to “increasing employment, rising wages and 
salaries, employee benefits plans, and expanding career opportunities” and 
contributed to “the rising standard of living of the average American 
family.”248 For the most part, generating growth did not conflict with the 
business goal of making profit. As the report further noted, the “profit-and-
loss discipline” led corporations to “improve goods and services, to reduce 
costs, and to attract more customers.”249 Profits also allowed corporations to 
“contribute importantly—through taxes and donations—to the financial 
support of public and private organizations working to improve the quality of 
life.”250 
By the 1970s, however, the number of perceived corporate constituencies 
expanded to include not only investors, consumers, and workers, but also 
“suppliers, the community, and perhaps even the larger society, governments, 
and future generations.”251 The demands on corporations dramatically 
increased. As the Committee for Economic Development report noted:   
[T]he expectations of American society have now begun to 
rise at a faster pace than the nation’s economic and social 
performance. Concentrated attention is being focused on the 
ill-being of sectors of the population and on ways to bring 
them up to the general well-being of most of the citizenry. 
Fundamental changes are also taking place in attitudes, with 
greater emphasis being put on human values—on individual 
worth and the qualitative aspects of life and community 
affairs.252 
With growing and diverse demands on corporations, the ideology of 
managerialism itself came under direct attack. For one thing, studies indicated 
that management-controlled firms were just as profitable as owner-controlled 
firms.253 Corporate managements were also seen as responsible, at least in 
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part, for the “economic distress” that characterized the 1970s.254 “[E]xternal 
economic shocks, compounded by a drop in productivity growth, cost-of-
living adjustments built into union contracts, and an economy shifting toward 
services” led to dramatic wage and profitability drop.255 Industrial 
corporations began a rapid “drift from the center toward the periphery of the 
economy,” and were replaced by newcomers from the technology and service 
sectors.256 Americans lost faith in their federal and state governments as well 
as in industrial corporations and their ability to improve the economy.257 
Seeking to understand and address the weaknesses of managerialism, 
corporate law scholars and policymakers turned to the independent directors 
to actively monitor corporate managers.258 The independent directors became 
the epicenter of the monitoring model of the board that was endorsed by the 
business and legal communities as well as the Delaware courts.259 It described 
directors as responsible for monitoring top executives and recommended that 
boards include a significant number of outside, independent directors.260 Yet, 
while progressive scholars sought to use the monitoring model of the board 
to impose duties on directors toward corporate constituencies other than the 
shareholders, the Delaware courts embraced a different vision, using the 
independent directors to justify Delaware’s embrace of the narrow goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization as corporate law’s purpose.261   
How could the Delaware courts be so oblivious to the demands of the 
community, especially given the prominence of such demands in the 1970s? 
One might suggest that the Delaware courts found the expanding concept of 
social responsibility difficult to address and feared that directors and 
executives simply would not be able to meet all the demands that the 
proposals discussed above made.262 The following section offers a different 
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262  See Thomas J. Zenisek, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Conceptualization Based on 
Organizational Literature, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 359 (1979) (arguing that corporate social 
responsibility is difficult to define).  
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reason. It explores how the shareholder value maximization became the 
Delaware courts’ response to the takeover movement of the 1980s. Described 
by Wall Street investment bankers as a natural response to inefficient 
conglomerates (and the managers who ran them), the takeover movement 
was seen by the Delaware courts as a threat to corporations and society, not 
unlike the threats of socialism in the early twentieth century or communism in 
the midcentury. In earlier decades the courts drew upon progressive and 
democratic ideologies to offer a purpose for corporations and corporate law 
so as to withstand the threats of socialism and communism. In the 1980s, the 
courts turned to shareholder wealth maximization to weather the threat of 
hostile takeovers. Just as Wall Street embraced this norm as a justification for 
hostile takeovers, the Delaware courts used it to empower corporate 
managers and directors to defend against unwanted bids. In so doing, the 
courts made shareholder wealth maximization the ultimate corporate 
purpose.263 
 
B. Economics and the Ethics of the Market Place 
 
In 1959, political theorist Robert Dahl commented that in the postwar 
years, political scientists, while remaining interested in “the relatively well 
established field of government regulation in the broad sense,” had left the 
study of the internal order of the corporation to economists.264 As I elaborate 
below, in so doing, political theorists opened a door for the removal of 
“questions of power, influence, sanctions, [and] legitimacy” that is, questions 
of government and political order—from the study of the firm.265 
Neoclassical economics stepped in to fill the gap. Until the 1960s, 
neoclassical economists focused their attention on pricing and paid little 
attention to the organization of industry. Then, in a series of works, beginning 
with Ronald Coase’s Nobel prize winning The Problem of Social Cost,266 
economists brought market analysis to bear upon the theory of the firm. The 
Problem of Social Cost emphasized the benefits of markets, arguing that, so long 
as transaction costs were zero (or minimal), individuals would enter 
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“transaction creating markets” both to avoid the costs of inefficient 
hierarchies and to “fill the vacuum left by the absence of preexisting market 
or command relationships.”267 Questions of welfare economics were left for 
philosophical discussions, and the science of economics became fixated upon 
the problem of transaction costs.268  
Economists and lawyers associated with the burgeoning law and 
economics movement welcomed The Problem of Social Cost, linking it with their 
own growing faith in the power of economic markets to produce the 
common good.269 Their new economic theory of the firm offered a picture of 
the corporation that fit the market-centered economic policies of the postwar 
years.270 Rather than putting management hierarchies and the need to 
constrain corporate power at the center of the corporate paradigm, the new 
economic theory of the firm found a way around hierarchy and regulation by 
drawing on microeconomics to describe corporate entities as nexuses of 
private, contractual relationships. The corporation was a collection of 
“disaggregated but interrelated transactions” among individuals or the 
convenient fiction of corporate entity in free and efficient markets.271 
Investors, managers, workers, and all other corporate constituencies were 
presumed to be self-interested wealth-maximizers operating in formally free 
markets. Concerns about managerial expertise were translated into questions 
about economic efficiency, and managers described corporate activities in the 
social sphere as “the pursuit of profit.”272 Public problems such as 
                                                                                                                                            
267  Guido Calabresi, The Pointless of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); see 
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. 
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neoclassical economics).  
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270  Patrick J. Akard, Corporate Mobilization and Political Power: The Transformation of U.S. Economic 
Policy in the 1970s, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 597, 597 (1992) (noting that despite “record 
inflation,” “the worst recession since the 1930s,” and multiple proposals for economic 
planning at the state and federal levels, by the early 1980s, U.S. economic policy heavily 
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271  William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 416–20 (1989); Bratton, supra note 181, at 1498; Oliver E. 
Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 
351, 365 (1983). 
272  PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1972); Maurice Zeitlin, Corporate Ownership and 
Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. SOC. 1073, 1094–97 (1974) 
(reporting studies demonstrating that both “management-controlled and owner-controlled 
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discrimination and growing disparities of wealth were depicted as providing 
industries with “opportunities for growth and profit.”273 The corporation was 
a means of achieving both; other goals were allowed only if incidental to 
profit and growth.  
As to the managers and directors’ accountability—law and economics 
scholars put their trust in the disciplinary power of the market for control. 
But such trust also ensured that corporate purpose would be evaluated merely 
by reference to profitability. Pursuing any other end, Henry Manne explained 
in 1972, would be devastating to corporations.274 Since shareholders expect 
profit, they would treat “any corporate expenditure that reduces their wealth 
position with disfavor regardless of the purpose for which the expenditure 
was made.”275 Stock price will adjust accordingly, making the corporation 
more susceptible to discipline by the market for control. As Manne explained, 
“[i]n such companies the incentive to purchase control will be measured by 
the difference between the current price of shares and the price that can be 
anticipated with more efficient or less ‘charitable’ managers.”276 
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 helped turn this market rhetoric 
into a political and economic reality. Reagan’s policies of deregulation helped 
create “the active market for corporate control” that Manne and other law 
and economics scholars celebrated.277 According to one report, “of the 150 
largest public corporations in the United States in 1980, 22 percent had been 
merged with or acquired by other public companies by 1988, while another 5 
percent had been taken private.”278  
In her ethnography of Wall Street, Karen Ho has explained how, at the 
time, investment bankers defended the takeover movement by retelling the 
postwar history of the publicly held corporation as a narrative about “self-
serving managerial class” that “squandered corporate resources extravagantly 
on themselves . . . and allowed foreign competitors to overtake the United 
States in productivity, innovation, and strategy.”279 Amidst the Reagan 
administration’s “dismantling of antitrust enforcement,” the conglomerates of 
the 1960s were seen as the prime example of managerial self-interest—a “fad” 
that was described as hindering corporate America’s competitiveness in global 
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274  See Manne, supra note 176 
275  Id. at 14.  
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markets.280 Accordingly, a primary goal of the takeover movement was 
“‘unlocking’ the value of ‘underperforming’ stock prices” to the benefit of the 
victims in this narrative—the shareholders.281  
In a very short time, Wall Street investment bankers, focused on 
increasing the value of their portfolios, and institutional investors, keen on 
achieving the same, were able to use the hostile takeovers of the 1980s to 
force corporations:  
to choose between shareholder value and other alternatives 
of corporate governance . . . By putting corporations “in 
play,” proponents of shareholder value created a historically 
unprecedented environment where all the largest 
corporations were up for grabs to the highest stock-price 
bidder, thus forcing them to be immediately responsive to 
the exigencies of the stock market.282 
Corporations began using their retained earnings and debt to return value 
to shareholders, defend against hostile tender offers, and finance successful 
takeovers.283 “‘[L]oyalty to workers, products, corporate structures, 
businesses, factories, communities, [and] even the nation’ . . . [were] viewed as 
expendable.”284 Institutional investors, investment bankers, and hostile 
bidders replaced corporate managers as custodians of corporate policy.285  
Stock price was rapidly becoming the medium for evaluating corporate 
performance and the ultimate corporate goal. Indeed, as I elaborate below, 
when the Supreme Court of Delaware was called upon to evaluate these 
changes and the potential threat they posed to corporations and society, it, 
too, ended up endorsing the rhetoric of stock price maximization.  
Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the seminal takeover case to reach 
the Supreme Court of Delaware, involved an attempt by Mesa Petroleum 
Corporation to gain control of Unocal Corporation, most likely in the hopes 
of being paid (by Unocal) to stop its takeover bid.286 Mesa’s tender offer 
provided the shareholders of Unocal with a premium over the market price of 
                                                                                                                                            
280  Id. at 130, 136. 
281  Id. at 130. 
282  Id. at 129.  
283  Mitchell, supra note 226 (providing and examining the empirical evidence supporting this 
argument).  
284  Khurana, supra note 254, at 303 (quoting Steven Prokesch, Remaking the American C.E.O., 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/25/business/remaking-
the-american-ceo.html). 
285  Id. at 302. 
286  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398 
 
 
204 Virginia Law & Business Review 13:2 (2019) 
their shares, but Unocal directors determined that the offer was inadequate.287 
Assessing whether or not the directors could adopt measures to defend 
against Mesa’s hostile bid, the court concluded that “the board’s power to act 
derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate 
enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, 
irrespective of its source.”288 While Unocal’s directors only pointed to the fact 
that the price Mesa offered was inadequate and thus potentially harmful to 
the shareholders, the court added that, in deciding whether or not to adopt a 
defensive measure, the board could evaluate “the impact [of the takeover bid] 
on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, 
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”289 
 As the above quote suggests, Unocal seemed to have embraced a 
corporate purpose that reached beyond the maximization of profit for the 
shareholders, at least in the context of hostile takeovers. Recognizing that the 
takeover movement could destroy corporations and damage the economy, the 
Supreme Court of Delaware wanted to empower corporate managers to 
defend against them, even if the Delaware General Corporation Law did not 
explicitly authorize them to do so.  
Yet, the Court was also keen on assuring investors, bankers and lawyers, 
that shareholders’ interests were sufficiently protected under Delaware law. 
Less than a year after Unocal, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., the Court endorsed the norm of shareholder wealth maximization used 
by hostile bidders, asserting:  
[W]e address for the first time the extent to which a 
corporation may consider the impact of a takeover threat on 
constituencies other than shareholders. . . . [W]hile concern 
for various corporate constituencies is proper when 
addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the 
requirement that there be some rationally related benefit 
accruing to the stockholders.290 
Jurists have debated the significance of Revlon to the law of corporate 
purpose.291 Whether or not Revlon supports the proposition that, even outside 
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the takeovers and acquisitions context, directors must focus only on the 
interests of the shareholders, other cases, especially those dealing with other 
financial constituencies, favored the limited purpose of maximizing value for 
the shareholders.  
For example, in Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., as part of a planned 
restructuring and recapitalization negotiated with Allied-Signal, Oak 
Industries, a company “in deep trouble,” extended cash and common stock 
exchange offers to its six classes of long-term debt securities.292 Tendering 
noteholders had to “consent to amendments in the indentures governing the 
securities,” amendments that would remove “significant negotiated 
protections to holders of the Company’s long-term debt including the 
deletion of all financial covenants.”293 These modifications would affect 
noteholders who chose not to tender into the exchange offers, but not those 
who tendered and received cash or stock.294 Failure to obtain the required 
consents from the noteholders would have allowed Allied-Signal to decline to 
complete the planned acquisition.295 An owner of long-term debt securities 
sought to enjoin consummation of Oak Industries’ exchange offers.296 
Acknowledging that the “purpose and effect” of Oak Industries’ 
exchange offers were to “benefit Oak’s common stockholders at the expense 
of the holders of its debt,” Chancellor Allen did not find the plaintiff’s claims 
to “allege any cognizable wrong.”297 As Allen put it, “[i]t is the obligation of 
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders.”298 If they do so “at the expense” of others, here 
the debt holders, it “does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”299 
Reducing the plaintiff’s rights to contractual rather than fiduciary claims, 
Allen held that Oak Industries did not breach the implied covenant of good 
faith in its dealing with its debt holders.300  
Two years later, in Simons v. Cogan, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
similarly treated an attempt by a holder of convertible subordinated 
debentures to hold directors liable for breach of fiduciary duties associated 
with a cash-out merger.301 Declining to extend the fiduciary obligations of 
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corporate management to holders of convertible debentures, Justice Walsh 
reasoned: “A debenture is a credit instrument which does not devolve upon 
its holder an equity interest in the issuing corporation.”302 A convertible 
debenture was not different, representing “a contractual entitlement to the 
repayment of a debt and . . . not . . . an equitable interest in the issuing 
corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with 
concomitant fiduciary duties.”303 To trigger a fiduciary duty, Walsh concluded, 
“an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must 
exist.”304 
Even preferences and limitations associated with preferred stock were 
deemed contractual. In Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., Chancellor Allen 
held that “with respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that 
distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its 
directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is appropriately 
defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that contract.”305 More 
recently, in In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, which addressed potential 
conflicting interests between the common and preferred stock during a 
merger, Vice Chancellor Laster made clear the implications of characterizing 
certain rights of the preferred stock as contractual.306 Directors, Laster 
reiterated, are required to “strive in good faith and on an informed basis to 
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of its 
contractual claimants.”307  
Why did the Delaware courts, faced with the threats of hostile takeovers, 
adopt the rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization, which investment 
bankers used to promote such transactions? Just as courts earlier in the 
twentieth century turned to corporate purpose to empower management, so 
did the Delaware courts in the 1980s. The courts’ refusal to extend fiduciary 
obligations to holders of debt securities, convertible debt, and preferred stock 
not only indicated that these constituencies would have to find ways 
contractually to protect their interests, but it also assured shareholders that 
corporations were run for their benefit. More importantly, it provided 
corporate managers with a tool, both practical and rhetorical, with which to 
thwart challenges to their power (including the threat of hostile takeovers). 
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Like courts throughout the twentieth century, the Delaware courts in the 
1980s offered managers a corporate purpose with which they could justify 
their actions; so long as corporate managers explained their decisions as 
maximizing wealth for their shareholders, the Delaware courts were not likely 
to intervene or evaluate their actions. Subsumed under the doctrine of 
fiduciary obligations, the maximization of profit for the shareholders became 
corporate law’s single purpose.308  
Directors were no longer entrusted with the task of making business 
decisions with the community—or even the corporation’s other 
constituencies—in mind. Rather, they were responsible for maximizing value 
for their shareholders, irrespective of the potential harm to other 
constituencies and the corporation as a whole. In turn, shareholders learned 
not only to expect but also to demand appreciation on their stock price.309 As 
the Introduction to this article explored, two decades after the wave of hostile 
takeovers led the Delaware courts to endorse the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. brought suit suggesting 
that Craiglist could not pursue its corporate purpose at the expense of 
maximizing profit for its shareholders, including eBay.310  
 
EPILOGUE 
 
Corporate America has changed dramatically since the 1980s—the 
number of hostile takeovers subsided considerably after the Delaware courts 
allowed managements to adopt measures such as poison pills to defend 
against hostile bids and effectively foil the market for control. The Enron and 
WorldCom scandals in the early 2000s and the financial crisis of 2008 
illustrated, among other things, the dangers associated with the exclusive 
pursuit of stock price maximization.  
In 2005, a survey of senior financial officers of the 400 largest U.S. 
corporations revealed that close to eighty percent would sacrifice a firm’s 
long-term economic value to meet analysts’ quarterly earnings expectations.311 
On the other hand, in 2016, a survey of 275 CEOs revealed the importance 
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they ascribe to corporate purpose (and not merely maximization of 
shareholder wealth).312 At least ninety percent of the CEOs indicated that 
“their company has a clearly stated and defined purpose,” and that such 
purpose helped shape “both their strategic framework and their corporate 
culture.”313 Sixty three percent of the CEOs indicated that having and 
“emphasizing purpose within their business” not only “contributed positively 
to revenue growth” but also “help[ed] build better employee engagement, 
brand reputation and customer loyalty, as well as attracting new business 
partners.”314 At the same time, a majority of the CEOs admitted that it was 
difficult to translate purpose “into action, operations and business as 
usual.”315 
In February 2017, the Washington Post reported that in recent years, 
American corporations have become “a force for social change,”316 eagerly 
jumping into the social and political arena to advocate causes such as gay 
rights, racial equality and, more recently, opposition to President Trump.317 
“Business leaders have taken political stances in the past,” Jena McGregor 
and Elizabeth Dwoskin wrote, “but usually behind the scenes.”318 With 
growing pressures from consumers and employees, as well as the easily 
accessible social media, speaking out about American politics, culture, and 
society is rapidly becoming the norm for corporate America.319  
 Despite these changes, and despite recent decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court that suggest that at least closely held corporations could 
pursue ends other than profit maximization,320 the Delaware courts have 
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remained unyielding in their apparent commitment to shareholder wealth 
maximization as the only corporate purpose. In different essays on the subject 
Chief Justice Strine has not only stressed Delaware corporate law’s 
commitment to profit maximization but also cautioned scholars arguing for 
broader corporate purpose, stating that “the continued failure . . . to be clear-
eyed about the role of the for-profit corporation endangers the public 
interest.”321 According to Strine, by ignoring the realities of for-profit 
corporations and assuming that “they are moral beings capable of being 
‘better’ in the long-run than the lowest common denominator,” scholars and 
jurists neglect to push for much needed regulatory change.322 
 Yet, while committed to the rhetoric of shareholder wealth 
maximization, the Delaware courts have, for the most part, focused on 
empowering managers, not on ensuring that shareholders profit. If Wall 
Street investment bankers in the 1980s fought for shareholder wealth 
maximization to rein in corporate managers and ensure the profitability of 
their portfolios, the Delaware courts embraced the norm as a means of 
ensuring that corporate managers remained in control. Take, for example, 
eBay Domestic Holding, Inc. v. Newmark, the case with which this article began. 
Chancellor Chandler’s decision in eBay prevented Craigslist from diluting 
eBay’s 28.4% ownership stake. At the same time, however, Chandler allowed 
Craigslist to institute a staggered board that prevented eBay from ever gaining 
control of Craigslist. As Chandler explained, “[b]y challenging the Staggered 
Board Amendments . . . eBay . . . seeks to obtain a benefit it was not able to 
obtain under the Shareholders’ Agreement. In trying to undo the staggered 
board, and thereby protect its mathematical ability to fill a board seat, eBay is 
doing exactly what it accuses Jim and Craig of doing.”323 Without a seat on 
the board, eBay, despite its 28.4% stake, did not have the “knowledge of and 
the ability to influence Craigslist’s strategic decisions.”324 Five years after it 
presumably won its corporate purpose argument, eBay gave in. On June 19, 
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2015, eBay confirmed that “it sold its 28.4 percent stake in Craigslist back to 
the San Francisco-based online classified company,” indicating that “the deal 
also came with an agreement that all litigation between the companies will be 
dismissed.”325 
 In the end, the discourse of corporate purpose cannot be separated 
from the history of corporate power, specifically the power of corporate 
management. While the law of corporate purpose shifted from channeling 
corporate power and the power of those in control in the early twentieth 
century to promoting American democracy in the midcentury years to 
maximizing value for the shareholders at the century’s end, throughout the 
twentieth century, cases addressing the question of purpose, including the 
ones discussed in this article, have almost always upheld the decisions of 
corporate managers. Within a few years of Milton Friedman’s famous 
equation of corporate social responsibility with the maximization of profit, 
J.A.C. Hetherington commented:  
[I]t is questionable whether the affirmative duty to maximize 
profits can be effectively enforced because of the practical 
impossibility of defining precise standards to measure 
degrees of adequacy of managerial performance where no 
self-dealing or negligence is involved . . . . In effect, 
therefore, only the prohibitory aspects of fiduciary 
responsibility lend themselves to judicial enforcement; the 
affirmative mandate to maximize profits to benefit the 
owners is policed only by management itself or through 
outside institutions, such as the stock market.326 
Once the courts have begun to examine the corporation’s purpose as an 
aspect of directors’ and managers’ fiduciary obligations, the presumption of 
the business judgment rule has guaranteed that the shareholders would not be 
able to force directors to fulfill the goal of wealth maximization. As Stephen 
Bainbridge writes, “the business judgment rule effectively precludes courts 
from reviewing corporate decisions that allegedly further interests other than 
that of shareholder wealth maximization.”327 The very few exceptions—
perhaps Dodge, maybe Revlon or eBay—are interesting cases but they do not, in 
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craigslist-sells-minority-stake-back-to-craigslist/#61a813686c1d. 
326  J. A. C. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 258 (1969).  
327  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 769, 778 (2006). 
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fact they cannot, alter the rule, that is, the business judgment rule. Under 
Delaware corporate law, decisions about a corporation’s purpose, like any 
other business matter, are in the discretion of corporate directors and 
executives. The latter have defined and will continue to define the role and 
purpose of corporations in our society.328  
 
                                                                                                                                            
328    On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable issued a new “Statement on the Purpose of 
a Corporation.” Our Commitment, BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE,  https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2019). The statement (which was released too late to be addressed in this 
article) was signed by more than 180 CEOs, who committed to “[d]elivering value to 
[their] customers,” “[i]nvesting in [their] employees,” “[d]ealing fairly and ethically with 
[their] suppliers,” “[s]upporting the communities in which [they] work,” and “[g]enerating 
long-term value for shareholders.”  Id. The statement concluded by noting: “Each of our 
stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future success 
of our companies, our communities and our country.” Id. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398 
